Self, Body, and Coincidence
Shoemaker (Sydney)
Source: Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Vol. 73: 1999, 287-306
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals1 is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal2 will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties.
  2. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal3, the difference in the persistence conditions4 of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by these predicates, with the result that the physical properties that determine the person's mental states will belong to the person and not to the human animal5.

Comment:

Symposium with Galen Strawson - see "Strawson (Galen) - Self, Body, and Experience".

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