Reductionism
Cassam (Quassim)
Source: Self and World, June 1999, Chapter 5
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer


Oxford On-Line Abstract

  1. Derek Parfit1's Reductionist view of persons is a combination of reductionism about personal identity and the impersonal description thesis.
  2. This chapter argues against the impersonal description thesis, the thesis that it is possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist.
  3. It considers whether reductionism can accommodate the epistemological primacy of memory and the fact that it is not possible to give a full specification of the content of an I-thought without ascribing it to a particular person.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Nov 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page