Branching Self-Consciousness
Rovane (Carol)
Source: Philosophical Review 99.3, July 1990, pp. 355-395
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Parfit1's thesis that persons could survive without identity is tenable only if first person2 modes of thought do not presuppose the identity of the subject.
  2. Armed with the pronoun "I" subjects can form first person quasi-attitudes towards future and past selves with whom they are psychologically connected but not identical.
  3. When persons have foreknowledge of branching they can wield "I" to direct quasi-intentions separately at distinct future selves. Such foreknowledge also makes possible attitudes of self-concern that extend to more than one future self.
  4. This approach to the first person reveals significant limitations on reductionism3.


Also in "Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Personal Identity (Readings)".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page