Self-Reference: The Radicalization of Locke
Rovane (Carol)
Source: Journal of Philosophy 90.2, Feb. 1992, pp. 73-97
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    The psychological view of personal identity, and with it Locke's distinction between 'person' and 'human being', is defended on several grounds. First, psychological relations are necessary and sufficient for the self-directed ethical attitudes of responsibility and self-concern. Second, there are real instances of non-human persons1: multiple and corporate persons. Third, McDowell's objections to these instances of non-human persons2 is refuted, through a consideration of his arguments appealing to identification-free self-reference.

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