<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Cocchiarella (Nino) - On the Logic of Natural Kinds (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4948.htm">On the Logic of Natural Kinds</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/C/Author_Cocchiarella (Nino).htm">Cocchiarella (Nino)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Philosophy of Science 43, No. 2. (Jun., 1976), pp. 202-222.</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4948.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PapersToNotes_4948.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>JSTOR Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">A minimal second order <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal logic</A><SUP>1</SUP> of <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>2</SUP> is formulated. Concepts are distinguished from properties and relations in the conceptual-logistic background of the logic through a distinction between free and bound predicate variables. Not all concepts (as indicated by free predicate variables) need have a property or relation corresponding to them (as values of bound predicate variables). Issues pertaining to identity and existence as impredicative concepts are examined and an analysis of mass terms as nominalized predicates for kinds of stuff is proposed. The minimal logic is extendible through a summum genus, an infima species or a partition principle for <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>3</SUP>. </ol></FONT><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper focuses on the confrontation in our common sense and scientific frameworks between (1) ontology and <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>4</SUP> in the context of a theory of <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>5</SUP> and (2) our conceptual devices for quantifying, identifying, and classifying things. It assumes that there are different stages of conceptual involvement in our common sense and scientific frameworks and investigates a stage at which <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>6</SUP> quantifiers and <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>7</SUP> identity are taken to be conceptually prior to absolute quantifiers and absolute identity and where the problem of cross-world and temporal re-identification of things is to be resolved in <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>8</SUP> terms. Only two minimal theses for re-identification through tense-logical and causal contexts are found to be valid on purely conceptual grounds; and while several other stronger theses are not found to be valid on purely conceptual grounds, their validity on ontological and methodological grounds is defended when the <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortals</A><SUP>9</SUP> in question serve to identify things belonging to a <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>10</SUP>.</ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:09" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:09:14</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>