Things, Relations and Identity
Allaire (Edwin B.)
Source: Philosophy of Science 34.3 (Sept. 1967), pp. 260-272
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper considers the following controversy. Suppose there are two exactly similar things, one to the left of the other. Some argue that the 'analysis' of such things requires the inclusion of particulars as well as properties. Others argue that particulars are not required because the spatial difference between the things accounts for the difference of them. The paper argues for a distinction between differentiation and individuation1. The former concerns property difference; the latter, numerical difference. The paper also argues that the belief that spatial difference accounts for individuation2 stems from a misunderstanding of ontological analysis. This paper considers the following controversy. Suppose there are two exactly similar things, one to the left of the other. Some argue that the 'analysis' of such things requires the inclusion of particulars as well as properties. Others argue that particulars are not required because the spatial difference between the things accounts for the difference of them. The paper argues for a distinction between differentiation and individuation3. The former concerns property difference; the latter, numerical difference. The paper also argues that the belief that spatial difference accounts for individuation4 stems from a misunderstanding of ontological analysis.

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