Cloning and Identity
Agar (Nicholas)
Source: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Volume 28, Number 1, February 2003, pp. 9-26(18).
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Critics of human cloning allege that the results of the process are likely to suffer from compromised identities making it near impossible for them to live worthwhile lives.
  2. This paper uses the account of the metaphysics of personal identity offered by Derek Parfit1 to investigate and support the claim of identity-compromise. The cloned person may, under certain circumstances, be seen as surviving, to some degree, in the clone.
  3. However, I argue that rather than warranting concern, the potential for survival by cloning ought to help protect against the misuse of the technology.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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