The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future
Kind (Amy)
Source: Metaphilosophy, 35, Number 4, July 2004, pp. 536-553(18).
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist1 view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit2 in "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons". Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism3 cannot provide justification for this attitude.
  2. In this article, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this connection reveals that the above-mentioned objection to reductionism4 cannot get off the ground.
  3. Though the connection I propose is weaker than the connection typically presupposed, I nonetheless run up against a conclusion reached by Susan Wolf in "Wolf (Susan) - Self-Interest and Interest in Selves". According to Wolf, metaphysical theses about the nature of personal identity have no significance for our attitude of special concern.
  4. By arguing against Wolf's treatment of self-interest, I suggest that her arguments for this conclusion are misguided. This discussion leads to further clarification of the nature of the link between theories of personal identity and our special concern and, ultimately, to a better understanding of the rationality of this attitude.

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