The Problem Of Who: Multiple Personality, Personal Identity And The Double Brain
Apter (Andrew)
Source: Philosophical Psychology, Jun91, Vol. 4 Issue 2, p219, 30p, 1 diagram;
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperColour-ConventionsDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    The received view of multiple personality disorder1 (MPD) presupposes a form of realism, according to which the 'secondary personality' is an independent conscious entity joined to the psyche of the host. The received view of MPD2 is endorsed by the majority of psychologists, as are the major diagnostic criteria for MPD. Realism of this type, gives rise to a certain problem concerning the personal identity of the secondary personality, namely, who this individual is. It is argued that three broad answers to the Question of Who in the context of MPD3 have been proposed in the history of psychology and psychiatry: psychological realism (Janet and the Dissociationist School); psychological anti-realism (Freud and the Psychoanalytic School), and neural realism (Wigan, Sperry and Gazzaniga). These views are examined. In addition, the relationship of the Question of Who to the traditional problem of personal identity is examined. It is argued that philosophers such as Locke, Reid and Parfit4 have either overlooked or presupposed the Question of Who.

    (??): Examines three psychological approaches on the philosophical question of identity in the context of multiple personality disorder5 (MPD). Relationship of the personality with personal identity problems; Psychological realism; Psychological anti-realism; Neutral realism.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Feb 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page