Let's Exist Again (Like We Did Last Summer)
Beck (Simon)
Source: South African Journal of Philosophy, 2001, Vol. 20 Issue 2, p159, 12p;
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper is a defense of a psychological view of personal identity against the attack Peter Unger launches against it in his Identity, Consciousness and Value. Unger attempts to undermine the traditional support which a psychological criterion1 of identity has drawn from thought-experiments2, and to show that such a criterion has totally unacceptable implications--in particular, that it allows that persons can go out of and come back into existence. I respond to both aspects of this criticism, arguing that the relevant thought-experiments3 (and the support they appear to offer) survive Unger's attack intact, and that he does not establish his case against intermittent existence4.
Second Abstract
    Focuses on the psychological view of personal identity of philosopher Peter Unger in South Africa. Importance of the consideration of psychological continuity5; Coincidence of physical and psychological continuity6; Strategies of Unger against the psychological criterion7.

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