The New Neo-Kantian And Reductionist Debate
Behrendt (Kathy)
Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 84, Number 4, December 2003, pp. 331-350(20).
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    Has Derek Parfit1 modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam's neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit2's recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I show why Parfit3 still needs this claim, and how it conflicts with the neo-Kantian view.

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