Personal Identity And Coherence Of Q-Memory
Collins (Arthur)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, 1997, Vol. 47 Issue 186, p73, 8p;
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperColour-ConventionsDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    Brian Garrett constructs cases satisfying Andy Hamilton's definition of weak q-memory1. This does not establish that a peculiar kind of memory is at least conceptually coherent. Any 'apparent memory experiences' that satisfy the definition turn out not to involve remembering anything at all. This conclusion follows if we accept, as both Hamilton and Garrett do, a variety of first-person authority according to which memory judgements may be false, but not on the ground that someone other than the remembering subject had the remembered experience. Garrett's brain-bisection illustration sounds convincing, but only because we retain the idea that the subjects created by implanting a hemisphere each in two different bodies are entitled to say that they remember experiences before the surgery in the ordinary sense. To that extent the illustration presents a case of ordinary memory, not q-memory2.(publisher)

    (???): Focuses on Andy Hamilton's pronouncements in `A New Look at Personal Identity,' in defense against Brian Garrett's arguments. Q-memory3 and presupposition of personal identity in the concept of memory; Distinctions of weak q-memory4 according to Hamilton; Exemplification of immunity to error through misidentification in memory-judgements; Contrast between personal and factual memory.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - March 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page