Personal identity and the R-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation?
Ehring (Douglas)
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73, Number 3, September 1995, pp. 337-346(10).
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. For Parfit1, identity and continuity part company in fission2 and this gives Parfit3 his wedge for downplaying the importance of personal identity.
  2. Contrary to Parfit4, the cohabitationist affirms that there are two people from beginning to end in fission cases, and these people severally occupy a common body prior to fission. The advertised advantage of this cohabitationist thesis is counter-revolutionary – the reconciliation of personal identity and psychological continuity5. Some cohabitationists affirm and others deny that prior to fission the cohabiting people share their thoughts, beliefs and desires.
  3. The purpose of this paper is to show that the cohabitationist who denies the 'shared thought' thesis cannot establish a reconciliation between identity and continuity.

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