Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence
Eklund (Matti)
Source: Nous, 36, Number 3, September 2002, pp. 465-485(21).
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    I argue that the fission problem shows that the concept of personal identity is incoherent. This contrasts with a more common analysis: that the fission problem merely shows certain proposed criteria of personal identity to be incoherent. The main part of the paper is devoted to making clear what this conceptual incoherence comes to, and what the consequences of this incoherence are for some of the main issues discussed in the literature of personal identity. Examines the problems and conceptual incoherence relevant to personal identity. Psychological and physical criteria of personal identity; Methods of considering counterfactual scenarios; Views on causation1, reference and knowledge

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