Thick and Thin Selves: Reply to Fischer and Speak
Kaufman (Frederik)
Source: Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 2000, Vol. XXIV Issue 1, p94, 4p;
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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. In response to a critique by John Martin Fischer and Daniel Speak, I argue that a psychological (thick) account of selves makes it clear why a person cannot exist earlier but could die later, thus, answering certain questions about the badness of death.
  2. Focuses on Epicurus' challenge regarding the badness of death. Death and psychological conception of personal identity; Concept of thin and thick self.

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