|Animalism versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie|
|Source: Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, Vol. 51 Issue 202, p83, 8p|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Statistics||Books / Papers Citing this Paper||Notes Citing this Paper||Colour-Conventions||Disclaimer|
Philosophers Index Abstract
I respond to criticisms by David Mackie in PQ, 49 (1999), pp. 369-76, of my previous paper on animalism1 and Lockeanism. I argue that the 'transplant intuition2', that a person goes where his brain (or cerebrum)3 goes, is compatible both with animalism4 and Lockeanism. I give three arguments for this conclusion, two of them developing lines of thought in Parfit5's work. However, I accept that animalism6 and Lockeanism are incompatible, and I go on to consider the difficulties for Lockeanism that this raises. The principal difficulty, concerning the reference of 'I', can be met by distinguishing the thinker of an 'I'-thought from the reference of an 'I'-thought. The reference is always the person thinking the thought, but when the thought is simultaneously that of an animal coincident but non-identical with that person, there is not a unique thinker. Mackie's criticisms of this view are ineffective.
Response to "Mackie (David) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: No Contest".
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
|© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Nov 2018.||Please address any comments on this page to email@example.com.||File output: |
Website Maintenance Dashboard
|Return to Top of this Page||Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page||Return to Theo Todman's Home Page|