|Coincidence Under a Sortal|
|Source: Philosophical Review, Apr96, Vol. 105 Issue 2, p145, 27p;|
|Paper - Abstract|
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Philosophers Index Abstract
This paper defends the thesis (called the Substance Thesis) that no two substances belonging to the same substantial kind can be in the same place at the same time. First, weaker theses allowing certain types of coincidence are distinguished and demonstrated. Secondly, the Substance Thesis is elaborated and a failed attempt to refute it is discussed. Thirdly, the thesis is shown not to be refuted by cases (called Leibnizian) of coinciding, ontologically dependent objects. Fourthly, it is shown in terms of discussion of key examples why coincidence is impossible for substances. Finally, the Substance Thesis is applied to personal identity, to show why persons cannot coincide and to refute a recent attempt to prove that they can.
Focuses on a philosophical study of the theses of coincidence, kind and substance. Definition of the term `sortal1'; Perceptions of author David Wiggins on the `Simple Coincidence Thesis'; How the thesis of substance may be applied to personal identity; In depth look at coincidence.
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