Is Personal Identity Evaluative?
Poltera (Jacqui)
Source: South African Journal of Philosophy, 2005, Vol. 24 Issue 2, p87-96, 10p
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryText Colour-Conventions


Author’s Abstract

  1. Martha Nussbaum subscribes to the view that our identity is an evaluative question determined by our common, deeply held beliefs about what is worthwhile in human life.
  2. In so doing, she asserts that for an account of ethics to have ‘philosophical power’ it needs to be grounded in an account of human nature that is both evaluative and internal.
  3. I focus on Nussbaum's claim that personal identity has to include the necessary features of practical rationality and sociability. Although Nussbaum puts forward self-validating arguments to prove that we cannot — on pain of pragmatic inconsistency — dispute that practical rationality and sociability are necessary features of human life, it is my claim that her account is flawed.
  4. The nature of the relationship between ethics and human nature is the broader context to such debates.
  5. This paper raises questions regarding on the one hand, whether it is possible to found ethics in human nature and, on the other, what we are to make of accounts that turn on the assumption that identity is ethical, not meta physical.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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