Selves and Moral Units
Shoemaker (David)
Source: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80 Issue 4, Dec99, p391, 29p, 1 diagram;
Paper - Abstract

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Abstract1

  1. Parfit2's concept of the self is problematic in important respects and it remains unclear just why and how this entity should count as a moral unit in the first place.
  2. In developing a view I call "Moderate Reductionism," I attempt to resolve these worries, first by offering a clearer, more consistent account of what the concept of "self" should involve, and second by arguing for why selves should indeed be viewed as moral (and prudential) units.
  3. I then defend this view in detail from both "conservative" and "extreme" objections. (edited)

Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. Analyzes the relevance of a moral entity on the metaphysical property of self-units.
  2. Views of Derek Parfit3 on the metaphysics of persons and personal identity;
  3. Development of the moderate reductionist theory;
  4. Distinction between extreme and conservative reductionism.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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