- In "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Brown-Brownson Revisited" (BBR), Sydney Shoemaker's response to "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed" (S & SR), I am not sure how many of my own arguments or conclusions I quite recognize.
- Shoemaker reads me at certain important points as making further moves in a game in which he is a justly acclaimed virtuoso.
- But S & SR claims in effect that there is no such game and nobody should try to play it.
- I would that Shoemaker had treated "Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity" (Chapter 7 of S & SR) in its larger context, namely the general theory of identity and individuation1 and the key claim, which is upheld in "Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness" and "Wiggins (David) - Outline of a Theory of Individuation" (Chapters 1 and 2) and illustrated in "Wiggins (David) - Sortal Concepts: and the Characteristic Activity or Function or Purpose of their Compliants" (Chapter 3) that judgments of identity depend on sortal2 identifications, which in their turn determine a dialectic or casuistic of same and other that licenses or prescribes only judgments that respect, in their collectivity, the laws of identity.
- This is the true source of D(x), the Only a and b principle, about which Shoemaker so briefly expresses himself as so doubtful, and of the distinction that Chapter 7 seeks to secure between particular and universal. See below3. Part V.
Response to "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Brown-Brownson Revisited".
- Part V is the final part of Wiggins’s paper (other than the postscript) in which he addresses the Brown and Brownson brain-transplant conundrum.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)