<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Campbell (Scott) - Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival? (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5076.htm">Is Connectedness Necessary to What Matters in Survival?</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/C/Author_Campbell (Scott).htm">Campbell (Scott)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Ratio 14.3, September 2001, pp. 193-202(10).</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5076.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PapersToNotes_5076.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">The standard version of the psychological criterion or theory of personal identity takes it that psychological connectedness is not necessary for personal identity, or for <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>1</SUP> in survival. That is, a future person can be you, and/or have <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>2</SUP> in survival for you, even though there is no psychological connectedness between you and that future person. David Lewis, however, holds that psychological connectedness is necessary to both identity and <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>3</SUP> (which he takes to coincide). This entails, Lewis acknowledges, that if a human body were to live longer than connectedness lasts, then that body would  embody or  constitute a different person later on than it did to begin with. Moreover, Lewis accepts, a body may embody more than one person at any one time. Lewis claims that this can be reconciled to some degree with common sense if we count by person stages rather than by persons. I show, though, that Lewis' view cannot be salvaged in this way, and, moreover, that it leads to further absurdities. I conclude that as an account of identity and of <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>4</SUP> in survival, it is highly implausible, and most unsatisfactory.</ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:28" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:28:16</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>