- If four-dimensionalism is an ontological, rather than conceptual or ordinary-language, thesis, some traditional objections are misguided. It then does not require any particular semantics for tensed claims, does not imply any conceptual or epistemic priority of stage-talk, and does not preclude a distinction in ordinary thought between processes and things.
- A more metaphysical traditional objection is that four-dimensionalism precludes genuine change, but there is no good reason to regard the four-dimensionalist's conception of change as non-genuine.
- A better objection: four-dimensionalism assigns the wrong modal1 properties to continuants. Reply: everyone, not just a four-dimensionalist, should accept a 'flexible' account of de re modal2 predication. Counterpart theory is one such account, but not the only one.
- Best objection: four-dimensionalism precludes motion in homogeneous substances. Reply: it is only four-dimensionalism plus Humean supervenience3 that has the consequence, and even then, motion in homogenous substances may be allowed in many cases, assuming a holistic account of genidentity.
- Linguistic and epistemic objections – 209
- The no-change objection – 212
- A crazy metaphysic – 216
- The modal4 argument – 218
- Motion in homogeneous substances – 224
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)