- In this article I discuss identity and indiscernibility for person-stages and persons.
- Identity through time is not an identity relation (it is a unity relation).
- Identity is carefully distinguished from persistence1. Identity is timeless and necessary.
- Person-stages are carefully distinguished from persons2. Theories of personal persistence are not theories of identity for persons.
- I deal not with the persistence of persons through time but with the timeless and necessary identity and indiscernibility of persons.
- I argue that it is possible that there are non-identical but indiscernible temporally whole persons.
- I discuss the biographies of persons and develop the type or token distinction for persons. Twins3 in symmetrical or eternally recurrent universes are examples of indiscernible persons.
- I discuss temporal and modal4 branching, and I end with survival for person-tokens and eternity for person-types.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)