Should We Tolerate People Who Split?
Beck (Simon)
Source: Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1992 30:1-17
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The paper is a response to three influential arguments which purport to show that philosophers concerned with personal identity can afford to ignore thought-experiments1 involving one person becoming two. It is argued that the arguments of David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes all fail to show the irrelevance of such fission to the debate, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting.

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