Persons and Substances
Campbell (Scott)
Source: Philosophical Studies 104, Number 3, June 2001, pp. 253-267(15).
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion1 of personal identity entails that a person is not an object, but a series of psychological events.
  2. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive, I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to the way that substances exist.
  3. I develop ten criteria that such a ‘quasi-substance’ should meet, and I argue that a reasonable case can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria.
  1. The ‘Series’ Conception of a Person
  2. Substances and Quasi-Substances
  3. Snowdon’s Objection to the P Theory
  4. Does the P Theory Entail that a Person is Like a Teacher2?
  5. Unifying Conditions
  6. Software Operations and Q-Substances
  7. Is Softy the ‘Software-Person” a Q-Substance?
  8. Persisting States and ‘Causal Interweaving”
  9. Shoemaker’s Functionalism3 and his ‘Relatively Autonomous Self-Perpetuators’
  10. Shoemaker’s Second Sense of ‘Substance’
  11. Can a Psychological State Survive Fission4?
  12. Can a Psychological State Survive Teleportation5?
  13. Conclusion: The 10 criteria of a Quasi-Substance6

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 2: Note that this is a “phase sortal” approach

Footnote 5: Ie. Teletransportation.

Footnote 6: Well signposted in the paper!

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