Philosophers Index Abstract
- I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion1 of personal identity entails that a person is not an object, but a series of psychological events.
- As this is somewhat counter-intuitive, I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to the way that substances exist.
- I develop ten criteria that such a ‘quasi-substance’ should meet, and I argue that a reasonable case can be made to show that the psychological theorist's conception of a person meets these criteria.
- The ‘Series’ Conception of a Person
- Substances and Quasi-Substances
- Snowdon’s Objection to the P Theory
- Does the P Theory Entail that a Person is Like a Teacher2?
- Unifying Conditions
- Software Operations and Q-Substances
- Is Softy the ‘Software-Person” a Q-Substance?
- Persisting States and ‘Causal Interweaving”
- Shoemaker’s Functionalism3 and his ‘Relatively Autonomous Self-Perpetuators’
- Shoemaker’s Second Sense of ‘Substance’
- Can a Psychological State Survive Fission4?
- Can a Psychological State Survive Teleportation5?
- Conclusion: The 10 criteria of a Quasi-Substance6
Footnote 2: Note that this is a “phase sortal” approach
Footnote 5: Ie. Teletransportation.
Footnote 6: Well signposted in the paper!
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)