<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Campbell (Scott) - Could Your Life Have Been Different? (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5100.htm">Could Your Life Have Been Different?</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/C/Author_Campbell (Scott).htm">Campbell (Scott)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Jan2000, Vol. 37 Issue 1, p37, 14p; </th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5100.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PapersToNotes_5100.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Most philosophers who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity (such as Parfit and Shoemaker) say little about the issue of our existence and <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>1</SUP> in survival in other possible worlds. The article argues that there are two views that such a 'psychological' theorist could accept here. The first takes it that your psychology (i.e., your memories, beliefs, intentions, traits, etc.) could have been very different, yet you could still exist, or at least that you could still have <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>2</SUP> in survival. According to the second view, though, a possible person who is very unlike the actual you cannot be you, and cannot have <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>3</SUP> in survival for you. Difficulties for both views are presented but it is further argued that despite the apparent counterintuitiveness of the second view, the psychological theorist is best off accepting the version of it which is presented by the author.<BR><BR>(???): Points out the philosophical problems arising from the psychological theory of personal identity regarding the question of whether a person's life could have been different. Conception of a person by the psychological theorist; Origins thesis forwarded by Derek Parfit; Minimalist intuition of a psychological self; Desire to be different; Analysis of identity over time; Issue of possible lives after death.</ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:28" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:28:35</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>