Is Causation Necessary for What Matters in Survival?
Campbell (Scott)
Source: Philosophical Studies 126, Number 3, December 2005, pp. 375-396(22).
Paper - Abstract

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Author's Abstract

    In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters1 in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters2 in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact.
Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. The Psychological Theory
  3. Appropriate Causal Connections
  4. Some Further Possible Constraints
  5. The Narrow View
  6. The Wide View
  7. Psychological Sequentialism
  8. Can a Tiny Causal Difference Be Important?
  9. Kolak and Martin’s “MOC3” Argument
  10. The “New Club” Argument for Sequentialism
  11. The “Indiscernible Swap” Argument for Sequentialism
  12. A Sequentialist Solution to a Branching Problem
  13. Old Tapes of Yourself
  14. Does Swampy the Swampman Have What Matters4 in Survival for You?
  15. An Externalist Objection
  16. Counterfactual Dependence
  17. Opponents of Sequentialism
  18. Conclusion



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3: MOC = Mathematical Object-Configurations


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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