On the Alleged Necessity of True Identity Statements
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Mind, 1982, 579-584
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    In this paper I investigate a possible loop-hole in the standard derivation (the so-called barcan-kripke proof) of the thesis that any true identity statement is necessarily true. Building on a suggestion made by tom baldwin, I argue that, granted the assumption that the first-order principle of the substitutivity of identity is not a "stronger" principle than the second-order principle of the indiscernibility of identicals1, it may be objected that the standard derivation involves a fallacy of equivocation on the grounds that a wff of the form ' $$necessary$$ ("a"="a")' admits of two non-equivalent interpretations.

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