Humean Supervenience and Enduring Things
Haslanger (Sally)
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 339-359.
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    It is plausible that what happens across time depends on what is the case at each moment, i.e., that a world's non-occurrent properties supervene1 on the occurrent. David Lewis suggests that it follows from this that there are no enduring particulars; instead actual particulars persist by perduring. I argue that depending on one's choice of background principles -- concerning synchronic / diachronic unity, part / whole, and predication -- there are parallel strategies to guarantee that both perduring and enduring things supervene2 on occurrent qualities. A careful selection of principles allows a sparse theory of enduring things compatible with desired supervenience3.

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