<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Sider (Ted) - All the World's a Stage (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5125.htm">All the World's a Stage</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/S/Author_Sider (Ted).htm">Sider (Ted)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Haslanger (Sally) & Kurtz (Roxanne) - Persistence : Contemporary Readings</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5125.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperCitings_5125.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PapersToNotes_5125.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Most believers in temporal parts identify persons and other continuants with aggregates of temporal parts  "space time worms". I identify them instead with the instantaneous temporal parts themselves. Fortified with a temporal version of counterpart theory, this <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">stage theory</A><SUP>1</SUP> of persistence over time is the account best suited to solve the philosopher's repertoire of puzzles of identity over time. The stage theorist can agree that identity and <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>2</SUP> are both <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>3</SUP> in survival, that a statue is identical to the lump of matter from which it is made, and so on.</ol></FONT><BR><u>Author s Introduction</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Some philosophers believe that everyday objects are 4-dimensional spacetime worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts. Others accept  three dimensionalism , rejecting stages in favor of the notion that persons  endure , or are  wholly present throughout their lives. I aim to defend an apparently radical third view: not only do I accept person stages; I claim that we <em>are</em> stages. Likewise for other objects of our everyday ontology: statues are statue-stages, coins are coin-stages, etc. </li><li>At one level, I accept the ontology of the worm view. I believe in spacetime worms, since I believe in temporal parts and aggregates of things I believe in. I simply don t think spacetime worms are what we typically call persons, name with proper names, quantify over, etc. The metaphysical view shared by this  <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">stage view </A><SUP>4</SUP> and the worm view may be called  four dimensionalism , and may be stated roughly as the doctrine that temporally extended things divide into temporal parts. </li><li>In this paper I hope to provide what might be called  philosopher s reasons to believe the <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">stage view</A><SUP>5</SUP>, by arguing that it resolves various puzzles about identity over time better than its rivals. After replying to objections, I conclude that a strong case exists for accepting the <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">stage view</A><SUP>6</SUP>. At the very least, I hope to show that the <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">stage view</A><SUP>7</SUP> deserves more careful consideration that it usually is given.</li></ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ol type="1"><li>See <a name="W345W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.tedsider.org/papers/all_the_worlds_a_stage.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. </li><li>Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433-453; </li><li>Included in <a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6213.htm">Look (Brandon C.) - The Metaphysics of Material Beings: Constitution, Persistence, and Identity</A>"; </li><li>Photocopy filed in <a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5974.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 16 (S1: Sa-Sl)</A>". </li></ol><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:28" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:28:59</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>