Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines
Zimmerman (Dean)
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 265-288
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The paper explores relations among three Humean doctrines: (i) Things persist by having different temporal parts at different times; (ii) a series of temporal parts constitutes a persisting thing only if later temporal parts are causally dependent upon earlier ones; (iii) causation1 is not a fundamental relation, but something that supervenes2 upon noncausal properties and relations. C. D. Broad, Saul Kripke, and David Armstrong each saw that a persisting homogeneous substance would pose difficulties for the doctrine of temporal parts. I argue that supposing such stuff to be made out of momentary stages leads to intractable problems for the causal Humean.

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