<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Garrett (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5134.htm">Reply to Garrett</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View"</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5134.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperCitings_5134.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PapersToNotes_5134.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_857.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Annotated Printout filed in <a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5965.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 02 (B1: Ba - Be)</A>"; </li><li>From <a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>"; </li><li>Response to <a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_458.htm">Garrett (Brian) - The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>";</li><li>For the paper, see <a name="W6749W"></a><A HREF = "http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/bakersymp_replytogarrett.htm" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li><li>For my write-up, see <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_857.htm">Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Garrett</A><SUP>1</SUP> </li></ul><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P5134_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P5134_2"></A></u> (as at 17/08/2018 17:35:31): Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Garrett</B><BR><br><ol type="1"><li>This Note is currently work in <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_742.htm">progress</A><SUP>3</SUP>, and sadly does not yet include any of my own work. </li><li>It discusses a response </FONT><ul type="disc"><li><a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5134.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Garrett</A>"</li></ul>to a review </FONT><ul type="disc"><li><a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_458.htm">Garrett (Brian) - The Story of I: Some Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>"</li></ul>of </FONT><ul type="disc"><li><a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5137.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>", </li></ul>submitted to an e-Symposium, convened in 2001, to review </FONT><ul type="disc"><li><a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>" </li></ul>See <a name="W238W"></a><A HREF = "http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/bakersymp.htm" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>; logged as a pseudo-book at </FONT><ul type="disc"><li><a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>".</li></ul></li><li>I ve included below the full text of Baker s reply to Garrett, with (in due course) annotations as bullets below the numbered sections of Baker s text. The numbering is indexed to Garrett s paper. Not all of Garrett s Sections received a comment from Baker:- </li></ol><hr><BR><ol type="I"><b>Introduction</b><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">I want to thank Brian Garrett for his careful and detailed comments on <a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>". I ll respond to as many of his comments as I can. (They make me look forward to reading his <a name="20"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_97.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness</A>".) </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol><li><B>Section 1</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">I use the term  the Constitution View simply as a name of the view of human persons that I work out. I began by thinking about the relation between persons and bodies, and started with the idea of constitution-without-identity. In one way, I think that the idea of constitution is the more important of the two central ideas (the other of which is the idea of the first-person perspective), because the idea of constitution has general metaphysical application for understanding the whole material world. That s how I came to call my view  the Constitution View. Granted,  the Constitution and First-Person Perspective View would be more descriptive, but  the Constitution View is snappier. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol></li><li><B>Section 2</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">I use Castaeda s  * device to illustrate what I think is an important distinction namely, that between consciousness (which infants and higher nonhuman animals have) and self-consciousness (which, as far as we know, is unique to human persons). </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol></li><li><B>Section 3</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Garrett mentions that I need not invoke the  * device since an I*-thought is just an iterated I-thought, and we could say that  being able to think iterated  I -thoughts is the hallmark of self-consciousness. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Garrett notes that Castaeda made his point with  he* , not  I*. Right, but I couldn t illustrate the point that I want to make in terms of  he* . Castaeda s  he* is used to attribute a first-person reference. But a first-person reference, on my view, does not always manifest a first-person perspective. In  the dog believes that he* is about to be attacked, we are attributing to the dog a belief that (if he could speak) he would express as  I am about to be attacked. But this (pretend) speech would not indicate a first-person perspective. The dog is conscious, and thus has a perspective, the origin of which is always himself. For a dog, the (pretend)  I is just a default marker for the origin of his perspective. In a given context, we can often tell whether or not  he* attributes just a (pretend) first-person reference of a dog or a real first-person perspective. But since  he* does not always doesn t distinguish between attribution of a (pretend) first-person reference and a real first-person perspective,  he* would not serve my purposes in the way that  I* does. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Perhaps, as Garrett suggests, we should not say that a dog is involved in any (even low-grade) first-person phenomena. I disagree, because all consciousness, it seems to me, is perspectival. (The bone is over here, not there.) The dog is the origin of the perspective. (The bone is over here, not there, and I want it.) But, lacking a first-person perspective, the dog does not know that it is only the center of a perspective, not the center of the universe. He can t realize that there are other perspectives. The dog has a perspective (and thus engages in low-grade first-person phenomena); but the dog does not realize that he* has a perspective. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Garrett thinks that having a perspective is not sufficient for attributing  I -thoughts. Missiles may  have in-built maps with themselves as origin and can modify their speed and direction in sophisticated ways. But missiles don t have  I -thoughts. Garrett challenges me to say how I treat missiles differently from animals and infants. Here s how: infants and animals are conscious and the way that a conscious being  adjusts its behavior to fit its goals is by inferences relying on essential indexicals. The analogue of reasoning and inferring for the missile presumably can be described without using indexicals at all. ((Pretend) use of  I attributed to a missile would be exactly like our use of  now in a Minkowski diagram.) But (pretend) use of  I attributed to animals or infants marks use of indexical thoughts; (pretend) use of  I is not (pretend) use of the full-fledged  I of a first-person perspective. Attribution of (pretend) use of  I to animals and infants just marks the center of a perspective from which the infant or animal has indexical thoughts. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </li></ol></li><li><B>Section 4</B>: No comment from Baker. </li><li><B>Section 5</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Garrett notes that I  give some credence to the Russell-Geach view that first-person reference is eliminable from simple, direct-discourse  I sentences. What I was thinking of was that for animals that have an egocentric perspective  I am in pain =  There is pain. This is really just the point that I was making before about beings that are conscious, but not self-conscious: They can t conceive of the difference between attributing a property to themselves and attributing it to others. Hence, all pain is their pain, etc. I agree with Garrett that, in general,  I is ineliminable from even simple, direct-discourse sentences. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></ol></li><li><B>Section 6</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">I certainly share Garrett s view that self-consciousness can t be given a reductive analysis. Garrett says parenthetically,  I assume that in the present discussion we re talking only of the concept of self-consciousness, not the property it s a concept of. That property presumably is some kind of neural property (in us). It s only the concept that irreducible. I m not sure (yet) how to respond to this, but I think that in the end, I will not share the view of the relation between concepts and properties that this suggests. (In <a name="21"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1144.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism</A>" and in <a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20607.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - A Farewell to Functionalism</A>" I argue against functionalism in philosophy of mind.) </FONT><ul type="disc"><li> </li><li></li></ul></ol></li><li><B>Section 7</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Garrett sees no advantage in my separation of a sameness-of-body criterion of personal identity from a sameness-of-living-organism criterion. But traditionally, these are distinct. Aristotle (and Aquinas) would accept the latter, but not the former. He also notes that I didn t argue against his psychological view of personal identity, but my objection to any view that faces the duplication problem (and hence requires non-branching), I think, applies to his view as well. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol></li><li><B>Section 8</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Garrett makes an interesting point about circularity:  A circular analysis can still be illuminating, provided it makes vivid the connections between the target concept and some other range of concepts. Yes! Good point! </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></ol></li><li><B>Section 9</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Garrett criticizes my claim that we cannot give (noncircular) informative sufficient conditions for sameness of person over time without presupposing sameness of person. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">I meant  informative in the sense of helping us understand sameness of person. If someone produced informative sufficient conditions in this sense, I d be surprised....and I would be proved wrong. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Garrett suggests:  If my brain, body, and psychological stream continue as normal, and there s no duplication, fission, fusion, teletransportation, etc., then I will occupy this body tomorrow. Whether I deny this or not depends on the  etc. Would the  etc. rule out Locke s Prince and the Cobbler case? If not, then the Prince and the Cobbler case is a counterexample to the conditional. If so, then the  etc seems to function as an open-ended ceteris paribus clause that makes the account uninformative. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Garrett also sees an epistemic problem here:  Even in a normal everyday case, how is a person supposed to know at t2 that he existed in the same body at t1? I know that I exist in the same body (=am constituted by the same body) that I had yesterday, because it looks the same (warts and all). Also, had I been videotaped throughout the time between yesterday and today, no changes in my body would have been observed. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">I said:  Every morning when I wake up, I know that I am still existing  without consulting my mirror, my memory, or anything else. Garrett responds:  But, given Baker s no-constraints view of the first-person perspective, <I>how</I> can she tell? My first-person perspective is essential to me. If there is any experience that I am aware of, then I (with my first-person perspective) exist. If I m having an experience, there can be no question of whose first-person perspective is involved. (The only question that can arise is which body constitutes me at that time.) </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">The question of how I know that my first-person perspective persisted through the night makes no sense on my view: If I have any experience at all indeed, if I have any property at all then I exist; and if I exist, I have a particular first-person perspective. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Let me try to put it another way: Suppose that: (1) S wakes up and has an experience of being glad that she s alive; (2) I know without evidence that someone is having an experience of being glad that she s alive. Then it follows that (i) I exist (having my first-person perspective); (ii) I am identical to S. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">I think that there is much more to develop here, and I hope to turn to this kind of issue. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </li></ol></li><li><B>Section 10</B>: No comment from Baker. </li><li><B>Section 11</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Re: Indeterminacy. Vagueness is a general problem, about which I have no good solution. All the solutions known to me supervaluation, the epistemic view, degrees of truth, multi-valued logic either fail to solve the problem or are patently absurd (to me, anyway). </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">But I do think that it is a defect in a criterion of personal identity to admit of vagueness. (Maybe I read too much Chisholm.) I simply can t imagine partly existing and partly not existing. I either exist or not. It s only from a third-person point of view that vagueness seems possible. If there is a thought, then (pace Parfit) someone is having it. Whoever is having it has to exist. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </li></ol></li><li><B>Section 12</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The point of condition (T) a criterion of sameness of human person over time is to show that even though I can t give an informative criterion for identity of persons (embodied or not) over time, the fact that human persons are necessarily embodied (de re) does allow me to give an informative criterion for identity of human persons over time. Since the focus of the book is <I>human</I> persons, it seemed useful to show that I could give (noncircular) necessary and sufficient conditions for sameness of human persons over time, even if I couldn t give (noncircular) necessary and sufficient conditions for sameness of persons generally over time. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080"><I>Human person</I> is what I called a hybrid kind. <I>Person</I> is the dominant sortal. x at t1 is the same human person as y at t2 iff x is a person, y is a person, x is human at t1, y is human at t2 and x = y. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </li></ol></li><li><B>Section 13</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">(T6) is just essential embodiment of human persons. Garrett says:  [I]f immaterial substances are a logical possibility (as even many materialists think), then Baker should not be endorsing (T6). I disagree. From my claim that human persons are essentially embodied, it does not follow that everything that exists is essentially embodied. Perhaps there are essentially unembodied beings. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol></li><li><B>Section 14</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Garrett says that my conditions for <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_28.htm">taking persons seriously</A><SUP>4</SUP> are idiosyncratic. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">I clearly specified the sense in which I am claiming that other materialistic views fail to <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_28.htm">take persons seriously</A><SUP>5</SUP>. Conditions for <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_28.htm">taking persons seriously</A><SUP>6</SUP> (in the sense specified) are these: (1) Being a person is relevant to the fundamental kind of individual that one is; (2) Elimination of any person is elimination of an individual; (3) Having mental states is relevant to what a person is. These conditions do not seem idiosyncratic to me of course, they wouldn t. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">A lot of philosophers share Garrett s view that my conditions on <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_28.htm">taking persons seriously</A><SUP>7</SUP> are idiosyncratic. (But he is the first one I know of who suggests that this conception of <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_28.htm">taking persons seriously</A><SUP>8</SUP> should be denounced!) I want to hold my ground. I have a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P5134_9">paper</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P5134_9"></A> read at the Chisholm Memorial Conference at Brown University, <a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5194.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Ontological Status of Persons</A>", forthcoming in <I>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</I>. In it, I develop further and argue for this construal of <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_28.htm">taking persons seriously</A><SUP>10</SUP>. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </li></ol> </li></ol></FONT><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P5134_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P5134_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (17/08/2018 17:35:31). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_857.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P5134_9"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P5134_9"><B>Footnote 9</A></B></U>: Baker had the title as  The Ontological <u>Significance</u> of Persons . <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-17T21:37" pubdate>17/08/2018 21:37:42</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>