<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Noonan (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5135.htm">Reply to Noonan</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, e-Symposium on "Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View"</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5135.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperCitings_5135.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PapersToNotes_5135.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_858.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Annotated Printout filed in <a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5965.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 02 (B1: Ba - Be)</A>"; </li><li>From <a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>"; </li><li>Response to <a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_459.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>";</li><li>For the paper, see <a name="W6750W"></a><A HREF = "http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/bakersymp_replytonoonan.htm" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> </li><li>For my write-up, see <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_858.htm">Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Noonan</A><SUP>1</SUP> </li></ul><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P5135_2">Write-up</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P5135_2"></A></u> (as at 17/04/2018 21:04:19): Baker - Persons and Bodies - Response to Noonan</B><BR><br><ol type="1"><li>This Note is currently work in <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_742.htm">progress</A><SUP>3</SUP>, and sadly does not yet include any of my own work. </li><li>It discusses a response<ul type="disc"><li><a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5135.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Noonan</A>"</li></ul>to a review <ul type="disc"><li><a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_459.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Arguments Against Animalism: Comments on L.R.Baker 'Persons & Bodies'</A>"</li></ul>of <ul type="disc"><li><a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5137.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Precis of 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>",</li></ul>submitted to an e-Symposium, convened in 2001 to review <ul type="disc"><li><a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>"</li></ul>see <a name="W238W"></a><A HREF = "http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/bakersymp.htm" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>; logged as a pseudo-book at <ul type="disc"><li><a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3304.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder), Etc. - E-Symposium on 'Persons & Bodies: A Constitution View'</A>".</li></ul></li><li>I ve included below the full text, with (in due course) annotations as bullets below the numbered sections of Baker s text:- </li></ol><hr><BR><ol type="I"><b>Introduction</b><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">I very much appreciate the sympathetic account that Noonan gives of (some of) my views  especially my case against Animalism. I also appreciate Noonan s suggestion for replying to the <em>Many Minds Objection</em>.</FONT> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol><li><B>Section 1</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>It is certainly true, as Noonan says, that I take persons to be ontologically different from animals. This is one of the most controversial aspects of my view. Persons necessarily have first-person perspectives, and these first-person perspectives provide the persistence conditions of persons. The persistence conditions of animals stem from the purely biological properties (like metabolism, circulation, and so on). </FONT> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Noonan agrees that the first-person perspective has  fundamental significance in our view of ourselves and, I think, he recognizes a  gap between ourselves and non-human animals on which Baker insists, but, he goes on,  the move to the claim that it has ontological significance is not compelling. But I do not see that Noonan offers any real argument here. Granted, I have no demonstrative argument, but I do give a number of considerations in favor of my view. I have developed this theme further in <a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5194.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The Ontological Status of Persons</A>", forthcoming in <I>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</I>.</FONT> <ul type="disc"><li> </li><li></li></ul></li></ol></li><li><B>Section 2</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">My book tries to situate persons in a comprehensive nonreductive view of the material world. The idea of constitution-without-identity is a general idea, of which the idea of constitution of persons by bodies is a species. One of the novel features of my general view (and ipso facto of my view of persons) is a turn away from a traditional ontological assumption. Traditionally, philosophers have assumed that what something most fundamentally is depends on what it is made of. Underlying my view, by contrast, is a conviction that what something most fundamentally is often depends more on what it can do than what it is made of. I think that new technologies e.g., replacing damaged body parts with inorganic parts, building micro-machines from organic matter blur the lines between what is  natural and what is artifactual. And this, in turn, suggests that the traditional view should be replaced. What something is made of is often not as revealing of its nature as what it can do. Hence, two entities with similar constitutions (say, you and a gorilla) are ontologically less similar than two persons with very different constitutions (say, you and a Martian person (if there were any)). </FONT> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol></li><li><B>Section 3</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Some philosophers reject the idea of constitution-without-identity in favor of contingent identity. To the example (from Lewis) of the dishpan and the piece of plastic, I have two replies. Before giving them, I must mention that on p. 22, I state three basic assumptions of the book. The first is materialism of the natural world. The second is that all identity is strict identity; if x and y differ in their modal properties, they are nonidentical. (p. 22) The third is three-dimensionalism. I do not consider temporal parts. I shall continue to assume three-dimensionalism here. (As I mention on p. 22, if you take issue with any of my three assumptions, then regard my book as a conditional argument that shows how much ground can be covered under the assumptions.) Now to the replies to the dishpan example: </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">First, Noonan s treatment of this example (like Lewis s) depends on contingent identity, which I clearly reject on p. 22. [For an argument, see my <a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4281.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Why Constitution is Not Identity</A>": 599-621.] </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Second, if you take the dishpan and the piece of plastic that makes it up, where the dishpan and the piece of plastic begin and end at the same time, to be (contingently) identical, you have to give a <I>different</I> account of the relation between dishpan and the piece of plastic that makes it up when they do not begin and end at the same time. Suppose that both the dishpan and the piece of plastic come into existence at 9:00, and that the piece of plastic makes up the dishpan from 9:00 until noon. Case 1: At noon, a terrorist bomb blows the dishpan made of the piece of plastic to bits, and both piece of plastic and dishpan go out of existence. Case 2: At noon, the terrorist bomb merely blows a sizable hole in the dishpan, which at 1:00 is repaired by placing a new piece of plastic in the hole. From 9:00 until 12:00, the dishpan was made up of the piece of plastic. </FONT> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">Now the advocate of contingent identity will say that the dishpan and the piece of plastic are identical in Case 1, but not in Case 2. So, the contingent-identity theorist will need two theories of the relation between the dishpan and the piece of plastic: one for Case 1 (contingent identity) and a separate one for Case 2. It seems to me clearly better to have a unified theory of the relation between the dishpan and the piece of plastic that covers both cases as the constitution view does. According to the constitution view, the relation between the dishpan and the piece of plastic is the same in both Cases: constitution, not identity. (For more on the dishpan case, see Ch. 7.) </FONT> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul></li><li><FONT COLOR = "800080">I think that the idea of constitution-without-identity can accomplish what the idea of contingent identity is supposed to accomplish without introducing a kind of ersatz  identity that falls short of genuine identity strict, necessary, Leibnizian identity. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </li></ol></li><li><B>Section 4</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">By the way, I would not say that  no actual human person is identical with any actual human being. As I said in Chapter 1, the term  human being has been used ambiguously (long before I came on the scene): both to name a partly psychological kind, and to name a purely biological kind. So, I try to avoid the term. When I use it, I usually mean  human person. </FONT> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol></li><li><B>Section 5</B><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">I started with the question,  <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">What am I</A><SUP>4</SUP>? The answer that I gave is that I am most fundamentally a person, and I am constituted by a human body. Only later did I consider the much-fought-over question of personal identity over time. (I found <a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>" useful in thinking about this issue.) I can only agree with Noonan that I do not have a satisfactory account of personal identity over time; but neither, as I argued in Chapter 5, does anyone else. The reason, I think, is that personal identity over time cannot be analyzed in nonpersonal terms; hence, any account is circular. It is clear to me (but obviously not to everybody) that there is a fact of the matter about whether a particular person is I or not. I hope to pursue this topic further later on. </FONT><ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li></ul> </ol> </li></ol><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P5135_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P5135_2"><B>Footnote 2</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (17/04/2018 21:04:19). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_858.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-13T13:15" pubdate>13/08/2018 13:15:02</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>