The Necessity of Biological Origin and Substantial Kinds
Wilson (Jack)
Source: Wilson, Jack - Biological Individuality: The identity and Persistence of Living Entities; 1999, Chap. 4, pp. 69-81
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Author’s Abstract

In this chapter I argue that some features of a living entity’s biological origin as essential to it and explore the implications of this view for an entity’s sex and species membership. I argue that a living individual of any kind necessarily has its actual biological origins. The necessity of origin for biological entities guarantees that an entity is by necessity a member of whatever substantial kind it is actually a member. This alone does not entail that an individual will have the phenotype typical to the genetic makeup its sex chromosomes or an essential nature derived from its species membership. This chapter concludes my treatment of identity as a time.


  1. A Valid Argument for Sortal1 Essentialism;
  2. The Necessity of Biological Origin;
  3. Sex;
  4. Species Membership and the Necessity of Genealogy

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