Two Kinds of Possibility
Edgington (Dorothy)
Source: Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 2004, Vol. 78 Issue 1, p1-22, 22p
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    I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal1 notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.

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