Substance: Things and Stuffs
Broackes (Justin) & Hacker (P.M.S.)
Source: Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 2004, Vol. 78 Issue 1, p41-63, 23p
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Philosopher’s Index Abstract

  1. The categorial concepts of substance (thing) and substance (stuff) are described, and the conceptual relationships between things and their constitutive stuff delineated.
  2. The relationship between substance concepts, expressed by other count-nouns, and natural kind1 concepts is examined.
  3. Artefacts and their parts are argued to be substances, whereas parts of organisms are not.
  4. The confusions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers who invoked the concept of substance are adumbrated.

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