The Survival of the Sentient
Unger (Peter)
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 14, Oct2000, p325, 24p
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    Argues that with the biological approach, there cannot possibly be any philosophically adequate view of our existence or persistence. View that psychological approach is the only adequate approach for those non-personal sentient beings who will be found with typical living animals in the normal course of events; Conjecture that perhaps there are no ordinary entities.

  1. Introduction: Ourselves and Sentient Others.
  2. Questions of Strict Survival, Vegetable Cases and Transplant1 Cases.
  3. Thoughts and Concerns about Particular Sentient Beings: Avoiding Great Pain2.
  4. Can There Be an ENORMOUS Separation of Strict Survival and Relevant Concern?
  5. A Complementary Pain Test Confirms Our Avoidance of Great Pain Test3.
  6. Clear Moral Thinking about Particular Sentient Beings.
  7. Properly Painful Problems with Human Vegetables, and with Feline Vegetables.
  8. People and Seople.
  9. A Serson4 and His Body Are Distinct Entities.
    … Note: Finessing Questions about Materially Coincident Entities.
  10. Reference and Existence, Appearance and Reality
  11. Seople (Conceptually) Can Survive the Loss of Their Biological Lives.
  12. Are There ANY Ordinary Entities that CAN’T Survive Losing Their Biological Lives
  13. Maintaining an Adequate Philosophical Perspective on Ourselves.

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 4: “Serson” / “Seople” is Unger’s neologism for the sentient, whether or not they are persons.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

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