Lowe's Defence of Constitutionalism
Olson (Eric)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Number 210, January 2003, pp. 92-95(4)
Paper - Abstract

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    Constitutionalism says that qualitatively different objects can be made of the same matter at once. Critics claim that we should expect such objects to be qualitatively indistinguishable. E.J. Lowe thinks this complaint is based on the false assumption that differences in the way things are at a time must always be grounded in how things are at that time, and that we can answer it by pointing out that different kinds of coinciding objects are subject to different composition principles. I argue that he is mistaken on both counts.

Comment:

A response to "Lowe (E.J.) - Material Coincidence and the Cinematographic Fallacy: A Response to Olson".

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