Replies to Gallois, Hirsch and Markosian
Sider (Ted)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXVII, No. 3, May 2004, pp. 674-687
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Gallois's objection to my argument from vagueness is argued to turn on an equivocation between a loaded and an unloaded sense of 'fusion'. A new argument that Gallois's theory of temporary identity1 implies the A-theory of time is presented. Hirsch objects to my realism about ontology and my thesis that natural language quantifiers express an ontological notion of existence. I defend my realism (disentangling my conception of a natural kind2 from the notion of similarity); I defend my thesis about natural language, but also explore the possibility of moving the ontological debate from natural language to a new, invented language. I concede to Markosian that my ontology includes some surprising objects, and clarify the dimension of surprise. I reply to his criticism of my time travel3 argument, although my reply vindicates Wellsian, not Godelian, time travel4.

Comment:

Symposium on "Sider (Ted) - Precis of Four-Dimensionalism". See Sider - Symposium on Four-Dimensionalism.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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