Personal and Bodily Identity
Odegard (Douglas)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, 1969, 69-71
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Terence Greenwood ("Greenwood (Terence) - Personal Identity and Memory") attacks the possibility of bodily exchange by claiming that the legitimacy of a memory claim requires independent checkability and that the latter requires bodily continuity1.
  2. An imaginary change of body case can be sketched to show that independent checkability does not require bodily continuity2.
  3. Things seem otherwise only if we gratuitously assume from the start that the purported new owner of a given body must really be just its old owner with a radically changed character.


Response to "Greenwood (Terence) - Personal Identity and Memory".

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