A Defence of the No-Ownership Theory
Clarke (D.S.)
Source: Mind, 81, No. 321 (Jan., 1972), pp. 97-101
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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This discussion note defends Wittgenstein1's 'no-ownership theory' against criticisms of it by "Strawson (Peter) - Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics".
  2. First, it is argued that the pronoun in avowals functions as an address indicating the speaker and not as a logical subject, and hence that there is no need to postulate a person as its referent.
  3. Secondly, it is argued that experiences can be identified as 'my' experiences without introducing persons as owners if we regard the possessive pronoun as being used either to make an avowal or to refer to a previous one.

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