Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum
Horgan (Terence)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44, No. 4, Jun., 1984, pp. 453-469
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    I argue the inadequacy of a recent attempt by David Lewis to show that functionalism can accommodate inverted-qualia thought-experiments1.
  1. I then propose a hybrid theory2 of mind, which combines functionalism3 (for the non-qualitative aspects of mentality) with a type-type psycho-physical identity theory (for qualia).

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2020. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page