Kinds and Persons
French (Peter)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44, No. 2, Dec., 1983, pp. 241-254
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. "Person" is not a natural kind1 term nor does it have, as Wiggins suggests, a natural kind2 element.
  2. Person might be a purely conventional notion and entry into the class of persons governed only by social or political legislation.
  3. That is unacceptable, so a less arbitrary account of the entry requirements into the kind is provided.
  4. The outcome is that "person" names a kind into which more than human beings may be admitted.

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