Abstract Philosophers Index
- A plain existential proposition "A exists" about a continuant is made true by A itself, but for a temporally specific existential, "A exists at t", A need not suffice, not needing to exist at t.
- To make such propositions true we evoke occurrents (events, processes) from the life of A whose occurrence is vital to A's existence at t, and which essentially have temporal parts covering t.
- A then stands to its life as invariant to the field of an equivalence relation. It is explained why this does not make continuants abstract and why temporary intrinsic predications require tense.
- Discusses the worries on how to exist at a time without having temporal parts.
- Definition of continuants;
- Existence of continuance;
- Reasons why continuants, although products of abstraction, are not classically abstracts;
- Classical abstracta of Platonic philosophy;
- Abstraction theory of continuants;
- Relationship between continuants and occurrants.
- I can’t remember where this abstract came from, but the first one was definitely from the Philosopher’s Index.
- Also, I have this paper categorized under exdurantism for some reason. But it looks interesting, anyway.
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