Loose Identity and Becoming Something Else
Baxter (Donald L.M.)
Source: Nous, Dec2001, Vol. 35 Issue 4, p592, 10p
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Armstrong has loose identity be an equivalence relation, yet in cases of something becoming something else, loose identity is not transitive. My alternate account has an attribution of loose identity be really two: a true attribution of an underlying relation (perhaps not transitive) and a false attribution – a Humean feigning – of strict identity. The feigning may become less appropriate as the underlying relation grows more distant. What makes it appropriate initially is that the underlying relation supports a predictable change in some collective. The importance of the predictably changing collective is signaled by regarding it as a single thing.
Second Abstract
    Explains why we attribute numerical identity1 to things that, when we consider them, seem obviously distinct. Historically important move of saying that the cases are cases of identity in name only; Theory of parts and whole; Account of loose identity to resolve the puzzle of how something becomes something else.

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