Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs
Wiggins (David)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1990-91) IV. Pp. 61-85
Paper - Abstract

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Author's Abstract

  1. In this paper, I attempt two things:
    1. to state in a way that might suit an opponent of the position just as well as a friend one particular version of moral cognitivism;
    2. then later to say how a defender of the position might respond to certain objections that have currency in present-day discussions of moral realism, moral properties and the rest.
  2. But being more concerned to arrive at a natural statement of the position than to try to complete the effort to make it prevail, I shall begin by rehearsing deliberately the semantical and metaethical considerations that have influenced the particular formulation and terminology I propose.

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