- Endurantism1 is not inconsistent with the theory of special relativity, or so I shall argue.
- Endurantism2 is not committed to presentism, and thus not committed to a metaphysics that is at least prima facie inconsistent with special relativity. Nor is special relativity inconsistent with the idea that objects are wholly present at a time just if all of their parts co-exist at that time.
- For the endurantist3 notion of co-existence in terms of which “wholly present” is defined, is not, I will argue, a notion according to which co-existence is transitive. Although an absence of absolute simultaneity presents some problems for the endurantist4 claim that objects are wholly present whenever they exist, there are a number of ways that the endurantist5 can respond to this difficulty.
- Thus, I conclude, considerations pertaining to the theory of special relativity certainly do not rule out endurantism6 as a metaphysics of persistence.
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