Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity
Hales (Steven D.) & Johnson (Timothy A.)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 53 Issue 213, p524, 16p
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time. Endurantists1 hold that
    objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their
    existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and exist only
    partly at each moment of their existence. We argue that endurantism2 is poorly suited to describe the
    persistence of objects in a world governed by special relativity, and it can accommodate a relativistic
    world only at a high price not worth paying. Perdurantism, on the other hand, fits beautifully with
    our current scientific understanding of the world. We use only the implications of the Lorentz
    transformations, without appeal to geometrical interpretations, dimensional analogies or auxiliary
    premises like temporal eternalism.

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