<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Marcus (Ruth Barcan) - Essential Attribution (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5617.htm">Essential Attribution</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/M/Author_Marcus (Ruth Barcan).htm">Marcus (Ruth Barcan)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Journal of Philosophy 68.7 (Apr. 8, 1971), pp. 187-202</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=400><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5617.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">A minimal characterization of an essential property is given. Necessary properties are a broader classification under which essential properties fall. Further conditions lead to different modes of essentialism. Some of these are considered; in particular those conditions which might characterize individuating essences are distinguished from those which might characterize aristotelian essences. For such modes, especially the latter, the <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modalities</A><SUP>1</SUP> are taken on a physical or causal interpretation. That yields a definition of a causal conditional and illuminates the role of essential attribution in reasoning about causes. <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural kinds</A><SUP>2</SUP> are seen as aristotelian essences which play a special role in causal reasoning, a role which can be made quite explicit within the framework of a <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>3</SUP> structure. Within that structure, there do not emerge those paradoxes about causal reasoning which emerge in the standard logical framework.</ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:11" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:11:22</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>