Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity
Francescotti (Robert)
Source: Philosophical Explorations, Mar2005, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p69-81, 13p
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Olson ("Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus?", 1997) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus1 Argument, and Mackie ("Mackie (David) - Personal Identity and Dead People", 1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument.
  2. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker ("Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?", 1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail.
  3. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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